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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by defendants Henry Madamba and the 
Atlantic City Police Department (ACPD) from an amended 
judgment entered upon a jury's determination that 
Madamba discriminated against plaintiff Donna Hurley on 
the basis of her sex in violation of the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-1 et 
seq., and that the ACPD discriminated against her on the 
basis of her sex in violation of the LAD and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.S 2000e et seq. 
Donna Hurley cross-appeals from an amended judgment 
entered upon the jury's determination that defendant 
Nicholas Rifice did not discriminate against her in violation 
of the LAD. She also cross-appeals from the district court's 
order granting defendant John Mooney's motion for 
summary judgment and the district court's order denying 
her motions for prejudgment interest and an additur and 
granting her motion for attorney's fees subject to a reduced 
hourly rate. In addition, plaintiff Patrick Hurley appeals 
from the district court's order granting defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on his loss of consortium claim. 
 
Because the harassing conduct tolerated by the ACPD 
was longstanding and egregious, and because the trial 
court did not commit reversible error in its evidentiary 
decisions or its jury instructions, we will affirm the 
amended judgment insofar as it imposes liability and 
compensatory damages on the ACPD. However, because the 
punitive damages instructions did not require actual 
participation by upper management or willful indifference 
as required by New Jersey law, we will vacate the amended 
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judgment to the extent it imposes punitive damages against 
the ACPD and order a new trial on that issue. 
 
Our recent decision in Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 
149 (3d Cir. 1998), set forth our understanding of liability 
for aiding and abetting under the New Jersey LAD. In light 
of Failla, it is evident that the jury instructions on aiding 
and abetting erred in two critical respects. We will therefore 
reverse the amended judgment entered against Madamba 
because the instructions failed to require a finding that 
Madamba substantially assisted the harassment. We will 
also vacate the judgment entered in favor of Rifice because 
the instructions wrongly directed the jury to absolve Rifice 
unless he took affirmative harassing acts. However, we will 
affirm the district court's order granting Mooney's motion 
for summary judgment because, as we understand New 
Jersey law, he could not, as a nonsupervisory employee, be 
liable for aiding and abetting the ACPD's failure to prevent 
and redress harassment even if he affirmatively harassed 
Donna Hurley. We will also affirm the district court's order 
denying plaintiff's motions for prejudgment interest and an 
additur and granting plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees 
subject to a reduced hourly rate.1 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History2 
 
Plaintiff Donna Hurley has been an officer with the ACPD 
since February of 1978. She joined the force shortly after 
becoming the first female graduate of the Atlantic City 
Police Academy. Her husband, plaintiff Patrick Hurley, is 
also an officer with the ACPD. For purposes of clarity, we 
will refer to Donna Hurley as "Hurley," to Patrick Hurley as 
"Mr. Hurley," and to Mrs. and Mr. Hurley collectively as the 
"Hurleys" or "plaintiffs." The Hurleys met while training at 
the Police Academy and married in 1980. Hurley alleges 
that she was subjected to sexual harassment as early as 
her training at the Police Academy in the late 1970s. In 
1981 her then-supervisor, Sergeant Walter Reay, harassed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
2. The facts recited were all adduced at trial. 
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her by making sexually derogatory comments about her 
hygiene during roll call, disturbed her while she was 
changing in the drill room, spoke to her in condescending 
tones during radio transmissions, and held her to stricter 
standards than male officers. During that year, fellow 
officers allegedly referred to Hurley as "the cunt" and placed 
a tampon and a copy of Hustler magazine in her squad car. 
 
Despite these and other obstacles,3 Hurley was promoted 
in November of 1987 and became the first female sergeant 
at the ACPD. Although her title changed as a result of this 
promotion, Hurley claims that her assignments continued 
to be menial and provided no useful experience. At one 
point, for example, Hurley was assigned to the Juvenile 
Truancy Task Force, where her job was to keep statistics on 
juvenile truants and where, although a sergeant, she 
supervised no one. 
 
The ACPD divides its officers into three shifts: 8:00 a.m. 
to 4:00 p.m., or "Alpha Platoon"; 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 
midnight, or "Bravo Platoon"; and midnight to 8:00 a.m., or 
"Charlie Platoon." After working approximately two years as 
a sergeant on Alpha Platoon, Hurley was transferred in 
January 1990 to desk sergeant of Charlie Platoon, where 
she came under the direct command of defendant Captain 
Henry Madamba. The events at the core of this case 
occurred while Hurley worked in Charlie Platoon. During 
her first week on this assignment, Madamba allegedly told 
plaintiff that upper management sent a woman to his unit 
to "break his balls," and that he "did not expect [her] to be 
here on this shift very long." App. at 2749-50. Madamba 
also allegedly advised Hurley to request a hardship transfer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In addition to the harassment, Hurley testified that, prior to January 
of 1987, she was given "lowly positions that offered no useful experience 
or potential for advancement." Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 933 
F. 
Supp. 396, 405 (D.N.J. 1996). For example, she testified that she was 
assigned to the Records Bureau to perform menial copying tasks. See 
App. at 2420. She also testified that she was assigned to security desk 
duty, which consisted of signing civilians in and out of the department 
building, and fire watch, which consisted of watching one particular 
building for an outbreak of fire. Hurley did not, however, include a 
failure to train or promote claim in her complaint. 
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out of Charlie Platoon and gave a male officer with less 
seniority a more favorable schedule. 
 
Hurley testified that she was sexually harassed 
throughout her entire tour on Charlie Platoon by her 
superiors and her coworkers. This harassment included 
"keying out" her radio transmissions,4 demeaning 
comments by Madamba during roll call, and exclusion from 
sergeants' meetings. In addition, officers placed a sanitary 
napkin with sergeant's stripes over the roll call podium and 
affixed a dildo either to the wall or the podium in the roll 
call room. Finally, she was the subject of sexually explicit 
graffiti and drawings of herself at three locations on city 
property: the roll call room, the roll call bathroom, and the 
bathroom of the Masonic Temple, a building used by both 
employees and the public. Several of the most egregious 
examples of the offensive material, of appallingly low 
character, are set forth in the margin.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. "Keying out" or "clicking out" consists of depressing the "On" and 
"Off " buttons of a radio transmitter to block the communications of the 
officer who is using the airway. 
 
5. Hurley was compelled to attend roll call in front of a life-size 
drawing 
of herself performing oral sex as her supervisor, Madamba, sat eight feet 
away. In addition, the following graffiti appeared on a wall in the roll 
call 
bathroom, which was commonly used and open to the public: 
 
       Oh sweet Donna Hurley 
       With cunt hair so curley 
       Your blond hair seems so soft and stays in place 
       When I toss off my cookies in your face 
       I'd like to stick my cock in your ass 
       But when I think of Lt. Andros my cock gets soft fast 
       So keep up your spirits and don't get depressed 
       Cause even though your a cunt I'd like to press yourflesh 
       Though in uniform your rude and brass 
       Your just another sex machine with my cock in your ass 
 
Next to this was a graphic drawing of a naked women labeled "Donna 
Hurley" and bearing sergeant's stripes. Near the drawing, and apparently 
written by several different hands, were the scrawled phrases "just 
another fuck doll," "she should look this good." and "Lt. Andros was 
here." Lieutenant Andros was a co-worker with whom Hurley was 
rumored to have had an affair. 
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Hurley also testified that Madamba personally harassed 
her while she was on Charlie Platoon. In addition to the 
insults he directed at her during roll call and his decision 
to exclude her from sergeants' meetings, Captain Madamba 
allegedly refused to take action against officers who "keyed 
out" plaintiff 's radio transmissions, and told her that she 
was "too emotional" about the sanitary napkin incident. At 
one point, he reacted to the latest sexually explicit graffiti 
by rushing to see it and laughingly informing Hurley, in 
front of her colleagues, that "it's really bad," but he took no 
action to remove or prevent the appearance of the graffiti. 
In September of 1990, he sent a memorandum to defendant 
Rifice, an Inspector at the time, stating that Hurley had 
abused her sick leave. As a result, then-Chief of Police 
Robert McDuffie sent Hurley a memorandum requiring her 
to produce a doctor's note every time she took sick leave. 
 
Hurley testified that when she complained to Madamba 
that the harassment at Charlie Platoon was becoming too 
much for her, he replied that women in the private sector 
are protected against such harassment because they"sleep 
with their bosses." App. at 2776-77. When she attempted to 
change the topic of conversation and commented on 
Madamba's apparent weight loss, he stated that he lost 
weight by "having sex a few times a day," and that women 
came to him "when they're ready." App. at 2498-2508. 
Hurley interpreted this entire conversation as a solicitation 
for sex. 
 
Hurley also testified that another sergeant on Charlie 
Platoon, defendant John Mooney, sexually discriminated 
against her in two ways. First, Mooney made several 
sexually derogatory comments to her, some of which 
Madamba witnessed yet did nothing to stop. For example, 
Mooney remarked that he had heard that Hurley "liked it 
hard and stiff," and suggested that, when Hurley met with 
Police Captain McKenna, she was actually performing oral 
sex on him. See X App. at A2516, A2514. On another 
occasion, when Hurley was unable to locate her coffee mug, 
Mooney asked her if she wanted to drink out of his jock 
cup. See id. at A2514. Second, Mooney used his influence, 
which far exceeded his position as sergeant, to transfer 
Hurley to an undesirable assignment because of her sex.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although Hurley and Mooney shared the same rank at that time, she 
alleges that 
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In particular, Hurley claims that Mooney was responsible 
for her transfer from her position as Court Liaison Officer 
to the Juvenile Truancy Task Force. 
 
After Mr. Hurley's efforts to intervene on his wife's behalf 
failed, Hurley submitted a memorandum to Madamba on 
November 1, 1990, detailing the harassment she 
experienced during her tour on Charlie Platoon and 
requesting a transfer. Madamba forwarded Hurley's memo 
to the Chief of Police along with a memo of his own 
requesting that Internal Affairs conduct an investigation of 
Hurley for allegedly lying in the memo as part of a 
conspiracy to get money from the ACPD. No investigation 
along these lines was ever conducted. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Hurley was transferred to the Alpha 
Platoon shift of the Property and Evidence Unit. Although 
she had requested a transfer out of Charlie Platoon, Hurley 
alleges that this particular transfer constituted retaliation 
for her sexual harassment memorandum because the 
Property and Evidence Unit was widely regarded as an 
undesirable position, and the Alpha Platoon was 
incompatible with the personal schedule to which she had 
become adjusted while working on Charlie Platoon. Hurley 
also alleges that when she was transferred to the Property 
and Evidence Unit, she was denied a three percent pay 
increase that ACPD officers receive when transferred to 
plain clothes duty. She eventually received this increase on 
April 20, 1993, retroactive to November 8, 1990. Hurley 
contends that the harassment continued even after she left 
Charlie Platoon. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Mooney had obtained power far beyond that which would otherwise 
       be expected to be held by a mere sergeant. As a result of his years 
       of acting as the former chief 's aid and confidant, the political 
       prominence of his councilman father, the high position of his 
       brother-in-law, Inspector Polk, who is married to Mooney's sister, 
       Captain Michelle Polk, and the widespread perception in the 
       department that Mooney was destined to become the Chief, Mooney 
       was in a position to abuse his real authority without fear of 
       consequences. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 37. 
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For example, the graffiti apparently remained on the 
walls well after her transfer. Rifice, who had been promoted 
to Police Chief, testified at trial that he heard complaints 
about the graffiti as late as March of 1992, and Mr. Hurley 
took photographs of the graffiti in the summer of 1992. In 
addition, an EEOC investigation concluded that there was 
sexual graffiti in Hurley's work area as late as June of 
1993. Moreover, on June 13, 1992, while Hurley was 
attending a police seminar, Mooney, then Captain of 
Charlie Platoon, allegedly approached her and called her 
"the ass up from the Property Room" in front of two other 
sergeants. 
 
Hurley further avers that the Chief of Police, defendant 
Rifice, was aware of her plight and failed to take steps to 
protect her and discipline the perpetrators. She also 
testified that Rifice personally committed several affirmative 
acts of sexual discrimination against her. These acts 
included: (1) transferring her to the Property and Evidence 
Unit; (2) denying her access to Chief McDuffie; (3) denying 
her a three percent pay raise when she transferred to 
plainclothes duty; (4) denying her request for funeral leave; 
and (5) condoning an improper Internal Affairs investigation 
into her conduct while she was assigned to the Property 
Room. 
 
Hurley worked continuously until July 26, 1994, after 
which she went on an extended paid sick leave. She asserts 
that, as a result of the harassment, she has suffered severe 
emotional distress that has interfered with her work, her 
personal life, and her family life. Mr. Hurley alleges that the 
harassment has detrimentally affected his relationship with 
his wife. 
 
On July 10, 1992, Hurley filed complaints with both the 
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and the New Jersey Department of Law and Public 
Safety, Division of Civil Rights (DCR). Both complaints 
named the ACPD as the sole respondent and alleged that 
Hurley had been harassed while on Charlie Platoon. Hurley 
submitted an affidavit in connection with her EEOC 
complaint alleging that Madamba and Mooney harassed her 
during her tour on Charlie Platoon. She claimed that 
obscene drawings of her remained visible as late as March 
 
                                11 
  
of 1992, and that her transfer to the Property and Evidence 
Unit and denial of the three percent pay raise were in 
retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment. 
 
On January 30, 1993, before the EEOC had issued 
plaintiff a right to sue letter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 2000e- 
(f)(1), the Hurleys filed the district court complaint which 
stated all of Hurley's instant claims. Subsequently, on 
October 12, 1993, the EEOC issued a determination on 
Hurley's charge. The EEOC investigator found probable 
cause to believe that Hurley had been sexually harassed 
while she was on Charlie Platoon, but no probable cause on 
retaliation charge regarding the transfer to the Property and 
Evidence Unit and the denial of the three percent pay 
increase. On March 7, 1994, the Hurleys filed a second 
complaint. This complaint relied on the facts stated in the 
previous complaint and alleged discrimination pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2 and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-3(a). The district court subsequently consolidated 
these two complaints.7 
 
Following extensive discovery, each of the defendants 
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted 
Mooney's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed all 
claims against Madamba and Rifice with the exception of 
Hurley's aiding and abetting claims under the LAD. 
Additionally, the court dismissed all claims against the 
ACPD except for Hurley's hostile work environment claim 
under Title VII, Section 1983, and the LAD. 
 
The jury trial lasted more than two months. At the 
conclusion of the liability portion of the trial, the jury 
rendered a verdict against Madamba and the ACPD but 
found Rifice not liable. The jury awarded $575,000 in 
compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages 
against the ACPD but not against Madamba. A punitive 
damage hearing was conducted before the jury, at the end 
of which the jury awarded Hurley $700,000 in punitive 
damages. 
 
The ACPD and Madamba moved for judgment as a matter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that the Hurleys' retaliation claims, arising from the ACPD's 
acts after this lawsuit was filed, are not part of this appeal. 
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of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or a remittitur. 
Hurley moved for a new trial as to Rifice, and an additur 
with respect to the entire damages award. In addition, 
Rifice and Mooney, as well as Hurley, moved for attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
 
The district court denied defendants' motion for a new 
trial and for a remittitur as to punitive damages and also 
denied plaintiff's motion for an additur. However, the court 
granted defendants' motions for a remittitur with respect to 
the compensatory damages award, which the court remitted 
to $175,000. The court also denied the defendants' fee 
petitions, but granted plaintiff's petition, subject to a 
reduced hourly rate and the exclusion of hours spent in 
pursuit of unsuccessful claims. Hurley accepted the 
remittitur, and the court awarded counsel fees and costs in 
favor of Hurley in the amount of $516,046 and $70,135, 
respectively. The court then entered an amended judgment. 
This appeal and cross-appeals followed. 
 
II. The ACPD's Liability 
 
The ACPD argues that it is entitled to a new trial for five 
reasons. First, it contends that the district court abused its 
discretion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
by admitting "highly inflammatory and largely irrelevant 
evidence regarding alleged misconduct at the ACPD to 
which the plaintiff was not exposed." ACPD's Br. at 2. 
Second, it contends that the district court's ruling that 
plaintiff's psychiatric expert could testify about a second 
diagnosis that was not contained in his reports "result[ed] 
in prejudicial surprise `inconsistent with substantial 
justice.' " Id. at 40 (quoting Conway v. Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc., 687 F.2d 108, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
Third, the ACPD asserts that the punitive damage award of 
$700,000 against it is so excessive that it creates an 
inference that the jury's liability verdict "resulted from its 
passion and prejudice toward the City of Atlantic City." Id. 
at 46 (citing Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1382 (3d Cir.) (en 
banc), modified on other grounds, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 
1993)). Fourth, the ACPD claims that the district court's 
jury charge under the LAD was misleading, confusing, and 
contrary to the law. Finally, on reargument, which we held 
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in the wake of the recently decided Supreme Court cases of 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. 
Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), the ACPD submits that 
these cases entitle it to a new trial on liability. We will 
address these arguments in turn. 
 
A. Evidence Not Obviously Linked to Hurley's Experience in 
       Charlie Platoon 
 
During trial, and over defendants' objections, the district 
court permitted a number of witnesses to testify about 
alleged incidents of harassment and retaliation that were 
either remote in time from the "accrual date"8 or involved 
matters of which Hurley was unaware until after shefiled 
suit. This testimony can be divided into three categories: (1) 
testimony by four women who were associated with the 
ACPD about incidents of sexual harassment and retaliation 
of which Hurley had no knowledge until after commencing 
suit; (2) testimony by eight male police officers about 
"locker-room" conversations between men outside the 
presence of women; and (3) testimony by Patrick and 
Donna Hurley about several incidents of sexual harassment 
against Mrs. Hurley between 1978 and 1981. 
 
The ACPD raises several arguments to support its 
contention that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting this testimony. First, the ACPD points out that 
Hurley was unaware of most of these comments until after 
she filed suit. Thus, the comments could not possibly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In its August 4, 1995 opinion and order, the district court concluded 
that the claims that formed the basis of plaintiff 's sexual 
discrimination 
allegations began in late 1989 or early 1990, upon plaintiff 's transfer 
to 
Charlie Platoon. App. at 5752. However, at the beginning of trial, the 
court expanded the time frame from which plaintiff could assert claims 
of sexual discrimination to January 20, 1987, based upon the court's 
conclusion that such claims would have been within the six-year statute 
of limitations that the court found applicable to claims under the LAD. 
In Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 659 (N.J. 1993), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopted a two-year statute of limitations for claims 
under the LAD. However, the Montells court also held that its decision 
did not apply to cases pending at that time or to cases in which the 
operative facts arose before the date of the court's decision, see id. at 
662, circumstances present here. 
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contribute to a hostile work environment for her. Second, it 
argues that it was impossible to rebut most of the alleged 
incidents at trial because they occurred at unspecified 
times and locations. Third, the ACPD asserts that incidents 
from 1978 to 1981 were too remote in time to be probative. 
Finally, the ACPD maintains that the district court's 
limiting instructions regarding this evidence were 
insufficient to offset the unfair prejudice resulting from 
these rulings. 
 
1. The Challenged Evidence 
 
The district court permitted four women who had been 
associated with the ACPD to testify regarding the 
harassment of women within the department. Hurley did 
not witness any of these incidents, nor did she become 
aware of the alleged harassment until after she commenced 
suit. 
 
Martha Donovan, a municipal prosecutor for the City of 
Atlantic City, testified about some mistreatment of Hurley 
that she had observed and also testified about an incident 
involving Sergeant Edward Yard of the ACPD. According to 
Ms. Donovan's testimony, in the summer of 1989 Sergeant 
Yard called Ms. Donovan a "cunt" and stated that he "ought 
to slap [her] face" for giving him an order; the incident 
occurred in front of fifty other people, including other police 
officers, in the hallway of the courthouse. See IV App. at 
A831. Donovan immediately complained to her supervisor 
and the officer ultimately apologized. At some point 
thereafter, Sergeant Yard's responsibilities were changed, 
and he had minimal contacts with Ms. Donovan 
thenceforth. Ms. Donovan never reported the incident to the 
ACPD supervisory staff. 
 
Julia Cardy and Lisa O'Keefe, two civilian employees of 
the ACPD in the payroll department, testified that they were 
generally dissatisfied with their male ACPD supervisors. 
Ms. Cardy testified that in 1992, as a result of reporting her 
supervisor, Sergeant Griggs, to his immediate supervisor, 
Captain MacDonald, for his misbehavior, she was retaliated 
against and subjected to chauvinistic remarks. Ms. Cardy 
further testified that women were treated "pretty poorly" if 
they "spoke out" against the mistreatment. V App. at 
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A1166, A1171. Ms. O'Keefe stated that Sergeant Griggs and 
Captain MacDonald treated her with disrespect over a long 
period of time extending to at least 1992, when there was 
apparently some ill-feeling towards female employees as a 
result of Hurley's lawsuit. See IV App. at A858-60. She also 
testified that complaints to Rifice received no response, see 
id. at A862, although she ultimately filed a union grievance 
and the offending officers were removed from authority over 
the payroll department. 
 
Officer Deborah Rando of the ACPD testified about the 
derogatory and sexually demeaning statements made to her 
in 1992 by her supervisor, defendant Mooney. At one point, 
Mooney referred to her conduct in profane terms and, when 
she objected, informed her that no one would believe her if 
she complained. See id. at A943. Despite this, she did 
complain to Mooney's supervisor, who warned her to think 
about her career and told her not to repeat her allegations 
to anyone. See id. at A948-50. 
 
The district court permitted eight male police officers 
from the ACPD to testify at trial about derogatory 
comments made about women generally. These officers 
testified that, at least from 1990 to the time of trial, women 
were commonly referred to as "cunts," "douche bags," 
"broads," "bitches," and, as a group, "the crack troop." App. 
at A413, A768. In addition, one officer testified that most 
inspectors and captains commonly referred to Hurley as 
"the whacky [sic] cunt." Id. at 443. These same officers 
testified, however, that these comments were always made 
outside the presence of women. Hurley was unaware of 
these comments until after she commenced suit. 
 
Finally, the district court permitted both Patrick and 
Donna Hurley to testify, over objection, about events 
occurring well before the January 20, 1987 accrual date. 
For example, Mr. Hurley testified about alleged acts of 
discrimination against his wife dating back to her tenure at 
the Police Academy in 1978. He also testified about 
comments allegedly made by Hurley's supervisor, Sergeant 
Walter Reay, between 1978 and 1980. Reay supposedly 
asked Hurley about her personal hygiene and made weekly 
comments during roll call. 
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Hurley also testified about various incidents that 
allegedly occurred in 1981, when she was a patrol officer 
and Louis Rivera was her partner. Hurley testified that she 
"heard" that she was referred to as a "cunt." Id. at 2388-90. 
The court also permitted her to testify that, during 1981, a 
Hustler magazine was left on her patrol car seat and a 
tampon was hung from her rear view mirror. 
 
2. Admissibility of the Evidence 
 
In the district court's view, all of the evidence was 
admitted for the same purpose: to "permit[ ] the jury to 
more intelligently evaluate the evidence that did create 
liability." Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 411. The court reasoned 
that permitting 
 
       evidence of other women's experiences at the ACPD, of 
       the attitudes of male officers towards women generally, 
       and of Hurley's experiences prior to 1987 served 
       several important purposes in this trial. It allowed the 
       jury to gain insight into the motives, attitudes, and 
       intentions of the defendants. It gave them the 
       opportunity to evaluate the adequacy of management's 
       response to Hurley's complaints during the statutory 
       period. It provided the jury with a sense of whether the 
       events that took place during the statutory period were 
       anomalous or accidental, or instead were part of a 
       "pervasive and severe" pattern. 
 
        Plaintiff's treatment during the statutory period was 
       unquestionably influenced by and related to her 
       treatment throughout the course of her career at the 
       ACPD. Plaintiff's experience was reflective of the 
       general attitudes of the men around her; those 
       attitudes also influenced, and were revealed in, the 
       treatment of other women in the ACPD. 
 
Id. 
 
Although the district court believed that evidence of past 
harassment was "crucial to the jury's evaluation of the 
work environment at the ACPD," id. at 410, the court 
instructed the jury not to consider the evidence directly for 
purposes of liability. See id. at 411. Specifically, the court 
stated: 
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       You are to consider whether each defendant has 
       engaged in sexual discrimination for the period from 
       January 20, 1987, through January 20, 1993. You 
       may consider evidence from before and after these 
       dates to help you evaluate the defendants' conduct 
       from January 20, 1987, through January 20, 1993, 
       but liability attaches, if at all, only to defendants' 
       conduct during this period. 
 
Id. (alteration removed). The court believed that, "[b]y 
admitting the evidence but forbidding the jury to consider 
it as directly relating to liability, [it was] able to balance the 
interests of the plaintiff and the defendants." Id. In 
addition, the court instructed the jury that, in determining 
whether or not a hostile work environment existed, it could 
only consider conduct that actually altered Hurley's own 
work environment during the relevant period. See App. at 
A5278. 
 
The evidence issues fall largely within the ambit of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence."9 Rule 401 does not raise a 
high standard. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1994). Also implicated in our 
discussion is Rule 403, which provides, in pertinent part, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The parties have not argued that we need apply New Jersey procedure 
to the New Jersey claims, and we will apply the federal rules to both. See 
Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1994); cf. Wm. T. 
Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., Inc., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 
1982) (holding that the federal rule favoring admissibility of relevant 
evidence applies to state law claims in federal cases to which state law 
privileges might otherwise apply); Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 
905-06 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing the standard for applying state 
evidentiary rules in pure diversity cases). Nor is there any indication 
that 
New Jersey admissibility rules differ in any relevant respect, as we think 
New Jersey's law recognizes the same principles we discuss in text. See 
Rendine v. Pantzer, 648 A.2d 223, 237-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994) (discussing the admissibility of evidence of discrimination against 
other people to prove motive or intent under N.J.R.E. 404(b)), aff 'd in 
relevant part, 661 A.2d 1202, 1213 (N.J. 1995). 
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that "[relevant] evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury 
. . . ." We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, 
see Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 132 
(3d Cir. 1997), with substantial deference under Rule 403.10 
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion under Rules 401 or 403 by admitting most of the 
challenged evidence, and that the error with respect to a 
portion thereof was harmless. 
 
Evidence that women other than the plaintiff were 
subjected to a hostile work environment clearly meets Rule 
401's requirements in a number of situations. For example, 
a plaintiff may show that, while she was not personally 
subjected to harassing conduct, her working conditions 
were nevertheless altered as a result of witnessing a 
defendant's hostility towards other women at the 
workplace. See Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 457 ("A woman's 
perception that her work environment is hostile to women 
will obviously be reinforced if she witnesses the harassment 
of other female workers."). 
 
A plaintiff's knowledge of harassment or pervasively 
sexist attitudes is not, however, a requirement for admitting 
testimony on those subjects in a harassment suit. Evidence 
of harassment of other women and widespread sexism is 
also probative of "whether one of the principal non- 
discriminatory reasons asserted by [an employer] for its 
actions was in fact a pretext for . . . discrimination." Glass 
v. Philadelphia Elec. Corp., 34 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see also Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 
1995). In Glass, we found reversible error where the 
plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of past racial 
harassment to explain negative evaluations and the trial 
court excluded it because it was time-barred. Glass relied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We have held that a trial judge is given very substantial discretion 
when striking a Rule 403 balance, see United States v. Eufrasio, 935 
F.2d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1991), and that "a trial judge's decision to admit 
or exclude evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 may not be reversed unless 
it is arbitrary and irrational." Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 
F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). 
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on Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th 
Cir. 1988), adopting its holding that circumstantial proof of 
discrimination, including evidence of past harassment and 
evidence of discrimination against others in the protected 
class, is admissible. Moreover, in Rule 403 terms, this 
evidence is highly probative, hence it is unlikely that any 
putative prejudice therefrom will be unfair or will outweigh 
its value.11 
 
The principles established by our precedent apply to this 
case. Evidence of other acts of harassment is extremely 
probative as to whether the harassment was sexually 
discriminatory and whether the ACPD knew or should have 
known that sexual harassment was occurring despite the 
formal existence of an anti-harassment policy. See West v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 752 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Neither of these questions depends on the plaintiff 's 
knowledge of incidents; instead, they go to the motive 
behind the harassment, which may help the jury interpret 
otherwise ambiguous acts, and to the employer's liability. 
This kind of evidence is particularly important given the 
ACPD's main defenses at trial, which were that the 
incidents of abuse Hurley suffered were trivial horseplay to 
which both men and women were subjected and that its 
written sexual harassment policy was sufficient to insulate 
it from liability. Contrary to the ACPD's position, it is 
implausible in the extreme that Hurley was somehow 
immune from the pervasive sexism at the ACPD, as it was 
described by both female and male officers. See Hurley, 933 
F. Supp. at 411; see also Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth 
Corp., 996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that employees' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that, but for these precepts, clever discriminators might 
isolate each instance of discrimination and make it seem trivial or 
neutral. See Glass, 45 F.3d at 195; see also Aman v. Cort Furniture 
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996) (evidence of time-barred 
harassment and discrimination against others in the plaintiff 's class was 
relevant); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1511 
(11th Cir. 1989) (acts directed at others can be evidence of 
discrimination against the plaintiff). We also note apposite New Jersey 
precedent that a plaintiff may present evidence about the harassment of 
other women to establish employer liability. See Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, 
Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 462 (N.J. 1993). 
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remarks and racially derogatory notes sent by unidentified 
people were circumstantial evidence that management 
permitted an atmosphere of prejudice to infect the 
workplace). 
 
The challenged evidence creates a basis for an inference 
that Hurley was targeted for abuse because she was a 
woman. It also gives reason to infer that the ACPD knew or 
should have known not only what was happening to its 
female officers but also, and most importantly, that the 
written sexual harassment policy was ineffective, and 
patently so. Indeed, it is hard to imagine evidence more 
relevant to the issue of whether a sexual harassment policy 
was generally effective than evidence that male officers did 
not respect it and that female officers were not protected by 
it. 
 
Officer Rando and Ms. Cardy, for example, both testified 
about the dismissive and even retaliatory treatment they 
experienced when they reported male officers' misbehavior, 
and this was relevant, probative evidence that the ACPD 
was consistently insensitive to female employees' 
experiences of harassment. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence of frequent 
misconduct against plaintiff and others was "pertinent, 
perhaps essential" to the employer liability determination); 
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same), 
aff'd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57 (1986). This evidence remains highly relevant under 
Ellerth and Faragher. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 
(discussing evidence of city's general failure to disseminate 
and enforce its sexual harassment policy in rejecting the 
availability of the affirmative defense in a particular case of 
harassment). 
 
Aside from its relevance to the issue of whether the ACPD 
is liable for the hostile environment Hurley encountered, 
the evidence is also relevant to her intentional sex 
discrimination, quid pro quo, and retaliation claims. The 
general atmosphere of sexism reflected by the challenged 
evidence is quite probative of whether decisionmakers at 
the ACPD felt free to take sex into account when making 
employment decisions, when deciding whether to abuse 
their positions by asking for sexual favors, and when 
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responding to sexual harassment complaints. As Glass 
held, evidence of pervasive sexual harassment makes 
retaliation claims more credible, because harassers may be 
expected to resent attempts to curb their male prerogatives. 
See Glass, 34 F.3d at 195; see also Hawkins v. Hennepin 
Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 
Evidence of sexually derogatory and sexist harassment 
makes disparate treatment claims more credible as well, 
since such discriminatory acts stem from similar motives. 
See Glass, 34 F.3d at 192; Josey, 996 F.2d at 641; 
Hawkins, 900 F.2d at 155; Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1421. Other 
courts have found similarly with respect to quid pro quo 
claims. See Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1479-80; Phillips v. Smalley 
Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1532 (11th Cir. 
1983); Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 809, 816 (S.D. 
Ga. 1988). In this case, because of its high probative value, 
there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the 
challenged testimony from other officers.12 Any putative 
prejudice was not unfair, and at all events was outweighed 
by the probative value. Nor are any of the other Rule 403 
factors present to counsel exclusion. 
 
We do believe that evidence of events from 1979 to 1981 
was improperly admitted because it was too distant in time 
from the events at the center of the ACPD's liability. Hurley 
did not claim a continuing violation from 1979 to 1992, and 
the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
evidence from that distinct period in Hurley's career. We 
may find such error harmless only if "it is highly probable 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case." 
Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d 
Cir. 1989); see also McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
779 F.2d 916, 924, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1985). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We also note that the alleged vagueness in the testimony, which the 
ACPD emphasizes, is limited to the testimony about general conditions 
in the ACPD and not to the many specific incidents to which the 
witnesses testified. This "vagueness" stems from the fact that male 
officers' misconduct was apparently so common as to blend into the 
background except when something particularly egregious occurred. The 
extent to which witnesses' inability to identify dates and places affected 
the witnesses' credibility could be, and was, addressed on cross- 
examination. 
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In this case, the error was harmless. As the district court 
noted: 
 
       This is a case where the plaintiff was compelled to 
       attend roll call in front of a life-size drawing of herself 
       performing oral sex as her supervisor, Madamba, sat 
       eight feet away; where, in addition to pervasive graffiti 
       directed at plaintiff, a sanitary napkin bearing 
       sergeant's stripes dangled over the podium from which 
       she spoke, and a dildo was affixed to a wall or ceiling 
       nearby; and where plaintiff's professionalism and 
       performance were constantly undermined because the 
       men on the force could not tolerate a women among 
       them. It is a case where the plaintiff's supervisor 
       responded to plaintiff's entreaties by insinuating that 
       he might be able to help her if only she would sleep 
       with him. 
 
Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 413 (citations omitted). When 
viewed against the uncontestably relevant and admissible 
evidence, it is highly improbable that the improperly 
admitted evidence affected the judgment in this case. 
Indeed, were we to hold all of the evidence challenged by 
the ACPD inadmissible, we believe that its admission would 
still amount to harmless error, so clear is the evidence of 
the harassment Hurley experienced. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the ACPD's Rule 403-based 
evidentiary arguments fail. 
 
B. Dr. Hoyme's "Surprise" Testimony 
 
Dr. Hoyme, plaintiff's psychological expert, issued his 
first report on November 16, 1994. In that report, he wrote 
that "[m]y diagnosis [of Donna and Patrick Hurley] is 
Adjustment Disorder with mixed features of anxiety and 
depressed mood (309.28 DSM IV) . . . . This diagnosis 
carries an implied causal connection between their 
traumatic experiences (sexual harassment, hostile work 
environment, and subsequent harassment) and their 
symptoms." App. at 5387. Subsequently, on February 20, 
1995, Dr. Hoyme submitted another report in response to 
a report issued by defendants' psychological expert, Dr. 
Toborowsky. According to Dr. Hoyme's rebuttal report: 
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       Mrs. Hurley has experienced severe emotional injury 
       and pain as the result of sexual harassment in the 
       course of her work in the Atlantic City Police 
       Department. Contrary to Dr. Toborowsky's stance, it is 
       not necessary to prove that she has developed 
       diagnosable psychiatric disorder in order to recognize 
       or validate this substantial harm. 
 
Id. at 5849. 
 
On March 2, 1995, the magistrate judge ordered that Dr. 
Hoyme's rebuttal report be barred as untimely. Hurley 
appealed this decision to the district court, and the court 
initially upheld the magistrate's decision. The court also 
ruled, however, that Hurley could renew this motion at trial 
when the court "would have a better sense of the 
significance of the testimony." Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 408. 
Hurley renewed her motion at trial, and the district court 
overruled the magistrate's decision "[b]ecause [the court 
was] concerned that the magistrate judge's sanctions 
against the plaintiff cut too close to the essential truth- 
seeking function of the Court . . . ." Id. At trial, Dr. Hoyme 
testified about "another diagnosis that didn't neatly fit into 
the DSM criteria": a reaction to a "psychological assault." 
App. at 1667-68. He further testified that the defendants' 
conduct constituted an "aggressive attack on her" and a 
kind of "sexual assault" which caused severe pain 
comparable to a physical touching. Id. at 1726-29. In 
closing, Hurley's counsel also referred to Dr. Hoyme's 
"psychological assault" testimony as a basis for awarding 
damages. 
 
The ACPD argues that Dr. Hoyme's reference to a "second 
diagnosis" regarding a "psychological assault" on Donna 
Hurley constituted unfair surprise because the testimony 
was materially different from that offered previously and 
provided the defendants with no meaningful opportunity for 
rebuttal. This unfair surprise, according to the ACPD, was 
"inconsistent with substantial justice" and warrants a new 
trial. We disagree. 
 
A district court's decision to allow an expert to testify 
beyond the scope of his report is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. See Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. 
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Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994). "We determine 
whether there has been an abuse of discretion by 
considering four factors: `(1) the prejudice or surprise in 
fact to the opposing party, (2) the ability of the party to cure 
the prejudice, (3) the extent of disruption of the orderly and 
efficient trial of the case, and (4) the bad faith or willfulness 
of the non-compliance.' " Id. (quoting Beissel v. Pittsburgh & 
Lake Erie R. Co., 801 F.2d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
We cannot conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion by permitting Dr. Hoyme's so-called "second 
diagnosis." First, notwithstanding Dr. Hoyme's rebuttal 
report, his initial report hinted strongly at this "second 
diagnosis," because it contained an explanation of the 
severe harm inflicted by the extensive sexual harassment 
Hurley experienced. Second, the defendants actually 
received the rebuttal report and were unquestionably aware 
of the appealability of the magistrate judge's order. 
Moreover, the defendants had several weeks after Dr. 
Hoyme's testimony to prepare rebuttal testimony and, thus, 
cure any possible prejudice. Indeed, Dr. Toborowsky 
testified that he had previously read both the deposition 
and courtroom testimony of Dr. Hoyme. Third, there was no 
need to call any witnesses out of order or any other 
disruptions at trial. Finally, while this evidentiary dispute 
might have been the product of "discovery-based bickering 
between the lawyers" and the "institutional differences 
between lawyers, who demand unvarying precision, and 
psychiatrists," see Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 408, there is no 
evidence of bad faith. 
 
C. Inference of Jury Prejudice and Passion  
 
The ACPD contends that the $700,000 punitive damage 
award was the "product of the same abandonment of`cool 
reason' in favor of `outrage and disgust' which shocked the 
trial court's conscience with respect to the compensatory 
damages." ACPD Br. at 46. Indeed, the ACPD argues that 
this "award was so excessive as to give rise to a clear 
inference that the jury verdict was the result of mistake, 
passion, prejudice or partiality." Id. at 43. Therefore, 
according to the ACPD, we must set aside the jury's verdict 
and order a new trial. Once again, we disagree. 
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In Dunn, we observed that a defendant would be entitled 
to a new trial, rather than remittitur, upon showing that 
"the jury verdict resulted from passion or prejudice." Dunn, 
1 F.3d at 1383; see also 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 2815, at 165 (2d ed. 1995) 
(remittitur is "not proper if the verdict was the result of 
passion and prejudice, since prejudice may have infected 
the decision of the jury on liability, as well as on damages"). 
We further rejected the argument, however, that"the size of 
the award alone was enough to prove prejudice and 
passion." Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1383; see also Mason v. Texaco, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1561 (10th Cir. 1991) (reducing a 
punitive damage award of $25 million by one-half because 
it shocked the court's conscience, but upholding the jury's 
liability determination because there was no evidence it was 
tainted). Here, as in Dunn, the defendant's only evidence of 
jury prejudice and passion is the amount of the punitive 
damage award itself. This is insufficient, and the ACPD's 
argument cannot prevail. 
 
D. Jury Charge on Hostile Work Environment  
 
The ACPD also argues that it is entitled to a new trial 
because the district court erred in its charge to the jury on 
hostile work environment by mixing different concepts from 
Title VII and the LAD. Specifically, defendant contends that 
the district court strayed from Lehmann v. Toys`R' Us, Inc., 
626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993), in which the New Jersey 
Supreme Court formulated the basic standard for 
determining whether acts of harassment in the workplace 
constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the LAD. 
Under the Lehmann standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that "the complained-of conduct (1) would not have 
occurred but for the employee's gender; and it was (2) 
severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman 
believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered 
and the working environment is hostile or abusive." Id. at 
453. 
 
The ACPD argues that the district court erred when it 
instructed the jury to consider ten factors, which the 
district court primarily derived from the ABA Model Charge13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Section 104[2][b] of the ABA Model Charge provides the following list 
of factors that must be considered in hostile work environment claims: 
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and Title VII caselaw, when determining whether the ACPD 
was liable under the LAD. Finally, the ACPD argues that 
the district court failed to instruct the jury as to precisely 
how each of the factors bore on the issue of sexual 
harassment. "We generally review jury instructions for 
abuse of discretion to determine whether they are 
misleading or inadequate." Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 
F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997). 
"However, when the question is whether the instructions 
misstate the law, our review is plenary." Id. (citing Saverese 
v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1202 (3d Cir. 1989)). We review 
jury instructions to determine whether, "taken as a whole, 
they properly apprised the jury of the issues and the 
applicable law." Dressler v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 143 
F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Under the first prong of the Lehmann test, a plaintiff 
must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that she 
suffered discrimination because of her sex." Lehmann, 626 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) the total physical environment of the plaintiff's work area; 
 
       (2) the degree and type of obscenity that filled the environment of 
       the workplace, both before and after the plaintiff arrived; 
 
       (3) the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff upon entering the 
       environment; 
 
       (4) the nature of the unwelcome sexual acts or words; 
 
       (5) the frequency of the offensive encounters; 
 
       (6) the severity of the conduct; 
 
       (7) the context in which the sexual harassment occurred; 
 
       (8) whether the conduct was unwelcome; 
 
       (9) the effect on the plaintiff 's psychological well-being; 
 
       (10) whether the conduct was physically threatening; 
 
       (11) whether it was merely an offensive utterance; 
 
       (12) whether it unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff 's work 
       performance. 
 
ABA Model Charge S 104[2][b] (1994). 
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A.2d at 454. Because the LAD is not a fault or intent-based 
statute, a plaintiff "need not show that the employer 
intentionally discriminated or harassed her, or intended to 
create a hostile work environment." Id. at 454. 
 
The second prong requires that the objectionable conduct 
be sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to state an actionable 
claim. See id. at 455 ("We emphasize that it is the 
harassing conduct that must be severe or pervasive, not its 
effect on the plaintiff or on the work environment." (citing 
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991))). In 
adopting this test, the court expressly rejected the "regular 
and pervasive" standard set forth by this court in Andrews, 
895 F.2d at 1482. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
concluded that the Andrews test strayed from the United 
States Supreme Court's standard in Meritor and "would bar 
actions based on a single, extremely severe incident or, 
perhaps, even those based on multiple but randomly- 
occurring incidents of harassment." Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 
455. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently 
concluded that a plaintiff created a triable issue based on 
a single racial slur. See Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 
(N.J. 1998).14 
 
The third prong of the Lehmann test considers the 
harassment from the perspective of a reasonable woman (or 
man, as the case may be). Such an objective, gender- 
specific standard, according to the court, "provides 
flexibility" by "incorporating community standards" and 
focuses attention "on the nature and legality of the 
conduct, rather than on the reaction of the individual 
plaintiff," Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 458, and it also 
"recognize[s] and respect[s] the difference between male and 
female perspectives on sexual harassment." Id. at 459. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In Taylor, the plaintiff presented evidence that her chief ranking 
supervisor called her a "jungle bunny" in the presence of another 
supervising officer. The court concluded that these circumstances "were 
sufficient to establish the severity of the harassment and alter the 
conditions of plaintiff 's work environment." Id. at 693. Severity is 
measured by surrounding circumstances, see id. at 692, and " `[t]he 
required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct 
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.' " 
Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 455 (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878). 
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"Only an idiosyncratic response of a hypersensitive plaintiff 
to conduct that a reasonable woman would not find 
harassing is excluded by the reasonable woman standard." 
Id. at 458-59. 
 
Finally, under the fourth Lehmann prong, a plaintiff must 
show that "her working conditions were affected by the 
harassment to the point at which a reasonable woman 
would consider the working environment hostile." Id. at 
457. A plaintiff need not demonstrate psychological harm or 
economic loss. 
 
In this case, the district court's hostile work environment 
sexual harassment charge provided as follows: 
 
        It is important to understand that, in determining 
       whether a hostile work environment existed at the 
       Atlantic City Police Department, you must consider the 
       evidence from the perspective of a reasonable woman 
       in the same position. You must look at the evidence 
       from the perspective of a reasonable woman's reaction 
       to a similar environment under similar circumstances. 
       That is, you must determine whether a reasonable 
       woman would have been offended or harmed by the 
       conduct in question. You must evaluate the total 
       circumstances and determine whether the alleged 
       harassing behavior could be objectively classified as 
       the kind of behavior that would seriously affect the 
       psychological or emotional well-being of a reasonable 
       woman. The reasonable woman is simply an average 
       woman of normal sensitivity and emotional make-up. 
 
        It is equally important to understand, however, that 
       the reasonable woman standard applies only to the 
       issue of liability for hostile work environment sexual 
       harassment. It does not apply to liability for intentional 
       sexual harassment, retaliation, or quid pro quo 
       harassment, nor to the calculation of damages. 
 
        Plaintiff has alleged that she has been subjected to a 
       hostile work environment because of harassment based 
       on her sex. To prevail on this theory, she need not 
       demonstrate any job benefits were conditioned on 
       submitting to hostile sexual conduct or were denied 
       because of refusing to give in to that conduct. Rather, 
 
                                29 
  
       to establish a claim of hostile work environment sexual 
       harassment, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
       the evidence that the conduct about which she 
       complains, one, would not have occurred but for the 
       employee's gender, and it was, two, severe or pervasive 
       enough to make a, three, reasonable woman believe 
       that, four, the conditions of employment are altered 
       and the working environment is hostile or abusive. 
 
        The more severe the conduct, the less extensive it 
       need be for you to find it is hostile. 
 
        Conversely, the less severe the conduct, the more 
       persuasive [sic] or regular it should be in order for you 
       to find that it is hostile. 
 
        Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim must be 
       related to conditions which actually altered her own 
       work environment. Statements, actions, or conditions 
       which occurred at the Atlantic City Police Department 
       outside the presence of plaintiff and plaintiff was 
       unaware [sic] cannot be considered part of the hostile 
       work environment, unless you find such statements, 
       actions or conditions affected the plaintiff 's own work 
       environment. 
 
        In evaluating plaintiff's hostile work environment 
       claims you should consider the following factors: one, 
       plaintiff's reasonable expectation upon entering the 
       workplace; two, the total physical environment of the 
       area in which plaintiff worked; three, whether plaintiff 
       was exposed to sexually explicit words or comments, 
       drawings, graffiti, or obscenity in the workplace, and, if 
       so, the degree, persistence, and type such [sic] 
       obscenity to which exposed; four, whether the sexually 
       explicit words or comments, drawings, graffiti or 
       obscenity were directed at plaintiff, and, if so, the 
       frequency of the offensive encounters; five[,] severity of 
       the conduct and the context in which it occurred; six, 
       whether the conduct was unwelcome, that is, conduct 
       plaintiff regarded as unwanted or unpleasant; seven, 
       the likely effect on a reasonable woman's psychological 
       well-being; eight, whether the conduct reasonably[sic] 
       interfered with plaintiff's work performance; nine, the 
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       extent to which supervisors upon learning of sexually 
       harassing conduct, acted promptly and effectively to 
       respond to such conduct; [ten], whether the 
       complained of conduct was directed at men and 
       woman alike. 
 
        It is not enough that the work environment was 
       generally harsh, friendly [sic], unple[a]sant, crude or 
       vulgar to all employees of both sexes. In order tofind 
       a hostile work environment sexual harassment, you 
       must find that plaintiff was harassed because she is a 
       woman. The harassing conduct may, but need not be 
       sexual in nature. Rather, its defining characteristic is 
       that the harassment occurs because of the victim's sex. 
 
App. at 5276-79. 
 
We conclude that the district court's hostile work 
environment charge, taken as a whole, properly apprised 
the jury of the issues and law under the LAD. The charge 
clearly and accurately set forth the four-prong test set forth 
in Lehmann. Moreover, the court's list of factors provided 
additional guidance to the jury for its consideration of 
whether the requisite elements of liability had been 
established. Although this nonexhaustive list was largely 
derived from the ABA Model Charge and Title VII caselaw, 
we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court wouldfind 
many of these factors useful and relevant for deliberations 
in a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim 
under the LAD.15 See Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 452 ("In 
construing the terms of the LAD, this Court has frequently 
looked to federal precedent governing Title VII . . . as a key 
source of interpretive authority." (citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). As a result, we reject the ACPD's argument.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Because certain factors may or may not be relevant in any given 
case, our conclusion is necessarily limited to the facts of this case. 
Moreover, we do not suggest that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
only look to the ABA Model Charge and Title VII caselaw when fashioning 
a set of factors to guide the jury in its deliberations. 
 
16. Because we conclude that the ACPD remains liable under the LAD, 
we need not consider whether the district court's charge misstated the 
law under Title VII. 
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We also find no merit in the ACPD's contention that one 
of the factors referenced in the charge, the plaintiff's 
reasonable expectation upon entering the workplace, is 
inconsistent with Lehmann's requirement that the finder of 
fact consider workplace hostility "from the perspective of a 
reasonable woman." ACPD's Br. at 49 (quoting Lehmann, 
626 A.2d at 457-58). In this case we do not see the harm 
from the shifting reference. Indeed, we fail to see how this 
distinction could aid the ACPD since, if anything, the 
"reasonable expectation upon entering the workplace" factor 
seems to give an employer extra leeway when a woman 
enters what she knows to be a traditionally male preserve, 
whereas the generalized reasonable woman standard is less 
concerned with what a workplace has traditionally been like 
and focuses on what a reasonable woman may rightfully 
expect from her employers. Finally, we reject the ACPD's 
contention that the district court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury as to precisely how each of the factors bore on the 
issue of sexual harassment. 
 
E. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth 
 
After the initial oral argument on this appeal, the 
Supreme Court decided Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth. These decisions 
substantially changed the law of Title VII on employer 
liability. The ACPD contends that it is entitled to a new trial 
under the Ellerth/Faragher standards. For a variety of 
reasons, however, we conclude that the new structure and 
taxonomy of Title VII liability makes no difference to the 
outcome in this case. We first address the ACPD's claim 
that it was entitled to an affirmative defense, and then 
discuss the effects of Ellerth and Faragher on the "quid pro 
quo" claims in the case. 
 
1. The Affirmative Defense 
 
The ACPD claims that the trial court's jury instructions 
were defective because the jury was instructed that the 
existence of an effective sexual harassment policy was 
merely a factor to be considered in imposing liability and 
not an absolute defense. There are four problems with this 
claim. 
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First, Ellerth and Faragher do not, as the defendants 
seem to assume, focus mechanically on the formal 
existence of a sexual harassment policy, allowing an 
absolute defense to a hostile work environment claim 
whenever the employer can point to an anti-harassment 
policy of some sort. The necessary elements of a defense are 
"(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. A stated policy should be 
"suitable to the employment circumstances." Id. 
 
The proof at trial focused extensively on what the ACPD 
did and failed to do about the harassment--issuing written 
policies but not enforcing them, painting over offensive 
graffiti every few months only to see it go up again in 
minutes, failing to investigate sexual harassment as it 
investigated and punished other forms of misconduct. 
Although it diligently attempted to convince the jury that its 
policies and procedures protected it, the ACPD failed to 
make a colorable case that its policies met the 
Ellerth/Faragher standards. See Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 
419; cf. Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 691 A.2d 321 
(N.J. 1997) (holding that a slow remedial process or one 
that leaves an employee exposed to harassment cannot be 
effective). In Faragher, in fact, the Court found it 
unnecessary to remand for consideration of the newly 
codified defense, since the record established that Boca 
Raton failed to disseminate its policies or monitor the acts 
of its employees, so that as a matter of law it could not 
prevail on the defense. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; 
see also Booker v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 
735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (rejecting the affirmative defense on 
a summary judgment motion because the employer had 
notice of incidents of discrimination but failed to act on it). 
 
A similar analysis applies here. The district court 
commented extensively on the ACPD's failure to implement 
anti-harassment policies or to inquire into the harassing 
behavior of any of its employees. It was evident that 
Madamba, a supervisor with the duty to stop harassment, 
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was aware of much of the harassment, even that which he 
did not himself inflict. The ACPD insists that there were five 
mechanisms that Hurley should have explored in full before 
suing: her direct supervisor, Internal Affairs, the Affirmative 
Action Officer, the Chief through his "open door policy," and 
the union grievance procedure. See ACPD Letter, July 16, 
1998, at 5. However, there was extensive testimony at trial 
about the ineffectiveness of these mechanisms. Moreover, 
Hurley had no obligation to try all these mechanisms, 
because her immediate supervisor, who was responsible for 
preventing and redressing harassment pursuant to the 
ACPD's own policy, was on notice of the harassment. An 
employer cannot "use its own policies to insulate itself from 
liability by placing an increased burden on a complainant 
to provide notice beyond that required by law." Williamson 
v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 1998).17 
 
Second, the ACPD apparently misreads the jury 
instructions. The liability instructions first stated that the 
ACPD would be liable for acts within the scope of a 
supervisor's employment, which was to be judged by the 
time, place, and foreseeability of the harassing acts. See 
XXII App. at A5281-82. The instructions continued that the 
existence of "a widely-disseminated anti-harassment policy 
or a well-publicized and an effective formal or informal 
complaint structure, training or monitoring mechanisms" 
would be evidence that sexual discrimination was not 
within the scope of employment. Id. at A5282.18 Then, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See also Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that, if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop 
harassment knew of and failed to act against it, the plaintiff has no 
further obligation to bring it to the employer's attention); Young v. 
Bayer 
Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding it sufficient for a 
plaintiff to give notice to someone who should reasonably be expected to 
stop the harassment or refer the complaint up the chain of command to 
someone who can stop it). 
 
18. The Ellerth/Faragher defense applies only to harassment occurring 
outside the scope of employment. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. For 
harassment to fall within the scope of employment, the harasser must be 
furthering the employer's purposes or acting in what he believes to be 
his employer's interests. See id. at 2266. The Court did not discuss how 
such motivations were to be determined, and we need not today address 
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instructions set forth the standard agency law on which 
Faragher and Ellerth relied--the employer is not liable for 
acts outside the scope of employment unless (1) the 
employer intended the conduct; (2) the employer was 
negligent or reckless in that it knew or should have known 
about the supervisor's actions and failed to take prompt 
and effective remedial measures; or (3) the supervisor was 
purporting to act as a supervisor, he had authority to 
control the employee's working environment, and his 
actions were aided and abetted by the authority delegated 
by the employer. See XXII App. at A5282-83 (tracking 
Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 461-62). 
 
Next, the instructions listed factors to consider when 
determining whether the employer's negligence contributed 
to a supervisor's sexual discrimination: the existence of a 
formal anti-harassment policy; the presence of effective 
formal or informal complaint structures, training, and/or 
monitoring mechanisms; the extent to which the employee 
used the existing complaint procedures; and whether the 
employer took prompt and effective remedial action in 
response to complaints. According to the instructions, these 
factors should be evaluated together. See id. at A5283 
(tracking Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 463). Finally, the 
instructions stated that the ACPD would be responsible for 
harassment by non-supervisory employees if it knew or 
should have known that such harassment was occurring 
and failed to take preventive or curative measures when it 
had reason to believe that harassment may have occurred; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
whether a patently ineffective harassment policy might communicate to 
male employees that harassment was an acceptable, expected means to 
interact with female officers. Rather, if the jury decided that the lack 
of 
an effective harassment policy justified holding the ACPD liable under a 
scope of employment theory, the same result would have been mandated 
under the Ellerth/Faragher standards for holding employers liable for 
negligence or for imposing vicarious liability when supervisory 
harassment creates a hostile work environment. The overlap between the 
standards was made clear by the instructions on negligence, which we 
describe infra in text. Thus, although this section of the instructions 
would no longer be appropriate to describe the scope of employment in 
a Title VII case, it did not mistakenly allow liability to be imposed in 
any 
circumstances in which an employer should properly be absolved. 
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the jury was instructed to consider whether the ACPD took 
"all reasonable steps necessary to address sexual 
harassment." Id. at A5284. 
 
The ACPD has failed to identify how these instructions 
conflict with Faragher and Ellerth, which relied on the same 
agency principles as Lehmann. Indeed the able trial judge 
quite presciently anticipated Faragher and Ellerth. The 
ACPD argues that the instructions allowed the jury to find 
it liable if the jury concluded that some factors outweighed 
the existence of an effective sexual harassment policy. See 
ACPD Letter, July 16, 1998, at 8. The ACPD presumably 
means that the jury could have used the extent of the 
harassment to discount the ACPD's anti-harassment policy, 
although the ACPD is not clear on this issue. Of course, 
under Faragher, the extent of the harassment would be 
helpful evidence of the actual effectiveness of a formal 
policy, which is a necessary element of the Faragher 
defense. But that is beside the point, as the ACPD has 
confused the part of the instructions that sets forth a ten- 
factor test for determining whether a hostile environment 
existed, see supra Section II.A.4, with the part of the 
instructions that dealt with the ACPD's liability assuming 
that the jury found a hostile environment existed, see XXII 
App. at A5282-84. If anything, the ACPD got to double-dip 
on its harassment policy, because the jury was told to 
factor it into the initial hostile environment determination 
and then to use it again when considering liability. See 
Payton, 691 A.2d at 327 (approving this dual use). 
 
A third reason to reject the ACPD's contention is that 
Faragher and Ellerth establish that the defense of employer 
due care is an affirmative one. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 
2270. Thus, the employer bears the burden of proof. The 
instructions given at trial put the burden on Hurley to 
prove that the ACPD was liable for negligence despite its 
harassment policy and other remedial measures. Any error, 
therefore, worked in favor of the ACPD and could not justify 
a new trial. 
 
Finally, Faragher and Ellerth do not necessarily control 
this case, which was also brought under the New Jersey 
LAD. Even if the jury instructions are not quite right with 
respect to Faragher, there is no colorable argument that 
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they misstated New Jersey law. For all these reasons, we 
conclude that these recent additions to Title VII 
jurisprudence do not require us to reverse the judgment of 
the district court. 
 
2. The Quid Pro Quo Instruction 
 
Hurley's quid pro quo claim was based on Madamba's 
alleged sexual invitations to her. She testified that when 
she complained about harassment to Madamba, he replied 
that women in the private sector avoided harassment 
because they "sleep with their bosses." When she attempted 
to change the subject and commented on Madamba's 
apparent weight loss, he stated that he lost weight by 
"having sex a few times a day," and that women came to 
him "when they're ready." Hurley interpreted this entire 
conversation as a solicitation for sex. 
 
The dissent argues that Ellerth and Faragher require us 
to reverse because those cases held that there could be no 
quid pro quo claim as such if the plaintiff neither submitted 
to sexual demands nor suffered retaliatory action when she 
refused to submit. The jury instructions, however, required 
only that the jury find either that a supervisor conditioned 
tangible job benefits on submission to unwelcome sexual 
conduct, or that a supervisor penalized Hurley for refusing 
to participate in such conduct. It is possible, though not 
certain, that such instructions could be read to cover 
threats that were not acted upon. We agree with the dissent 
that Ellerth and Faragher largely eliminated the distinction 
between hostile work environment claims and quid pro quo 
claims, focusing instead on the presence or absence of 
tangible adverse employment actions. See Durham Life Ins. 
Co. v. Evans, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 587 (3d 
Cir. Jan. 22, 1999). However, we conclude that the 
judgment should nonetheless be upheld. 
 
The dissent persuasively identifies the reasons that the 
quid pro quo claim was the least tenable of Hurley's claims, 
at least under Faragher and Ellerth. 19 In fact, the conduct 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We have no doubt that Madamba's suggestive remarks could be 
interpreted as a threat, and we do not mean to suggest that remarks of 
this sort cannot found a quid pro quo claim, though we agree with the 
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of which she complained was part of the hostile work 
environment she experienced, and this would necessarily 
have been apparent to the jury.20 But in light of the total 
record here, we are satisfied that no jury would have found 
the defendants liable solely on the basis of the quid pro quo 
instruction. Multiple sources--including physical evidence 
--corroborated the most egregious examples of sexual 
harassment, including the tampon incident and the 
obscene graffiti, see, e.g., infra n.5, while the only evidence 
of Madamba's suggestion came from Hurley's testimony. To 
us, it is inconceivable that a jury would have believed her 
testimony on this one issue, concluded that the ACPD was 
vicariously liable for one advance, and discounted the other 
incidents, which were sufficiently pervasive to consitute a 
hostile environment. Juries may be unpredictable, but we 
are not willing to posit total illogic, which would be contrary 
to our faith in the jury system as a whole. We are thus 
persuaded that any error was harmless. 
 
We addressed a similar issue in Murray v. United of 
Omaha Life Insurance Co., 145 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1998): 
 
       We agree that the jury charge as given by the district 
       court did not conform to New Jersey law as we predict 
       it. Nonetheless, we will not reverse a judgment where 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
dissent that the evidence of retaliation for refusal to accede is 
gossamer. 
Nor need we predict how New Jersey will react to Faragher and Ellerth. 
The LAD is a remedial statute, in some respects broader and more 
flexible than Title VII. See Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 452; id. at 460 (holding 
employers strictly liable for equitable damages and relief). This is so 
even 
though New Jersey often looks to the federal system for interpretive 
authority. See id. at 452. We thus believe it quite possible that New 
Jersey might retain a quid pro quo cause of action as such even after 
Ellerth and Faragher. The District Court's instructions, as the dissent 
notes, see Dissent at 66, are consistent with Lehmann. See Lehmann, 
626 A.2d at 452; see also Pukowsky v. Caruso, 711 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 
20. Madamba's alleged conduct is the kind of conduct for which the 
ACPD could attempt to interpose its affirmative defense, but, as we have 
already held, that defense would fail because the ACPD's dereliction was 
even worse than that in Faragher, in which the Court declined to offer 
the defendants an opportunity to make out the defense on remand. 
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       "it is highly probable that the error did not contribute 
       to the judgment," McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
       779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985), i.e., where the 
       challenged error was harmless. 
 
Id. at 156 (footnote omitted). An issue similar to that in this 
case arose in American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 
F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the District Court 
instructed the jury that it could return a verdict for the 
plaintiff if it found negligence in any one or more of thirty 
particulars. Each was supported by substantial evidence 
except one, and on that one count it was factually 
impossible that liability could appropriately be found. The 
court found that "it is . . . inconceivable that in the mass 
of testimony so clearly establishing negligence in thirty 
other particulars this issue could have influenced the 
verdict against American." Id. at 195 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
61). Although there were fewer than thirty viable theories in 
this case, the weight of evidence and argument on the other 
theories of liability leads us to the same conclusion here. 
 
We concede the general correctness of the dissent's 
proposition that faulty instructions on which a general 
verdict could have been based require reversal. The 
foundational case of Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490 
(1884), addressed itself equally to faulty instructions and to 
erroneous admission of evidence, and announced that such 
errors require reversal. See id. at 493 ("If . . . upon any one 
issue error was committed, either in the admission of 
evidence or in the charge of the court, the verdict cannot be 
upheld . . . ."). It has long been acknowledged, however, 
that Baldwin does not speak to the harmless error 
situation. See Asbill v. Housing Auth. of the Choctaw Nation, 
726 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1984) ("We note[Baldwin] 
does not paint with as broad a brush as appears from the 
language quoted. As with all errors committed at trial, a 
litmus test for reversal is whether the appellant was 
thereby unjustly prejudiced."). Evidentiary errors are 
subject to harmless error analysis, and the same is true for 
errors in instruction. See id. 
 
Given Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61's command to 
disregard "any error" that does not affect "the substantial 
rights of the parties," and the authorities set forth in the 
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margin,21 we do not believe that we are creating a new rule. 
The cases cited by the dissent for the proposition that we 
must reverse are distinguishable because they deal with 
instances in which the record rendered it impossible to 
determine the basis for the jury's decision. We discuss 
them, too, in the margin.22 To the extent that the dissent is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. See also Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(applying harmless error analysis to faulty instructions that, given the 
evidence, were unlikely to have influenced the jury); Kern v. Levolor 
Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1990) (where the relevant 
facts were the same for all theories, the evidence and argument focused 
on a legally correct theory, and it was unlikely that the incorrect theory 
influenced the jury, a verdict could be upheld despite one erroneous 
instruction); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(invoking harmless error rule for faulty instructions but rejecting it on 
the merits because of the evidence and arguments at trial); Lusby v. T.G. 
& Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that an 
improper instruction, identical to one rejected by the Supreme Court 
because it did not contain all the necessary elements, did not mandate 
reversal because there was "substantial evidence" supporting the correct 
theory of liability, and holding harmless error analysis appropriate to 
jury instructions "when the erroneous instruction could not have 
changed the result of the case"); Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 
F.2d 362, 377 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Baldwin with harmless error 
analysis); Horne v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. Co., 421 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 
1970) (finding a charge, if erroneous, harmless because the underlying 
facts so firmly supported the verdict on a proper charge); Roginsky v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying 
similar reasoning when one theory was improperly submitted to the 
jury); 11 Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure S 2886, at 467-70 
("Errors in instructions routinely are ignored if a motion for a directed 
verdict should have been granted, or if the erroneous instruction went to 
an issue that is immaterial in light of the jury's verdict, or if it is 
otherwise apparent that the error could not have changed the result." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 
22. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 
534 (3d Cir. 1998) (portion of instructions invited the jury to use 
impermissible factors, and, given the focus of the trial evidence, "such 
infection almost certainly occurred"); Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc., 139 
F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1998) (jury could have based liability on incidents 
of alleged negligence for which the standard of care was beyond common 
knowledge, and there was no expert testimony to guide them as to those 
incidents); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 (3d Cir. 1980) (reversing a 
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concerned about broad application of the harmless error 
rule, we agree entirely, and emphasize that our decision is 
founded on the extreme facts of this case. Because any 
error in the quid pro quo instruction could not by any 
stretch of the imagination change the verdict, we need not 
reverse. 
 
III. Punitive Damages 
 
The ACPD argues that the district court erred by failing 
to instruct the jury that punitive damages could only be 
awarded against the ACPD "if there was `actual 
participation by upper management or willful indifference.' " 
ACPD's Br. at 12 (quoting Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 464).23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
judgment based on the "distinct possibility" that the jury imposed 
liability based on incidents of defamation that should not have been 
submitted to the jury); cf. McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 
831-32 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment when an erroneous portion of 
the jury instructions "more than likely" guided the jury's deliberations). 
Carden v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1988), on 
which the dissent relies, concerned a situation in which the verdict could 
have been based on erroneously admitted "direct" evidence of 
discrimination; here, the instructions did not require the jury to look at 
evidence it should not have considered. Indeed, even Simko v. C & C 
Marine Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1979), while setting forth 
the general rule that errors in instruction require reversal, also cited 
with approval Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 26-27 
(2d Cir. 1976), describing its holding as follows: "[T]he general rule . . 
. 
must be followed unless it can be stated with confidence that the same 
verdict would have been returned even if the invalid claim had not been 
submitted to the jury." Simko, 594 F.2d at 967. 
 
23. The ACPD raises two other arguments concerning the punitive 
damage award, but they need not detain us long. First, the ACPD argues 
that plaintiff 's punitive damage award must be vacated as a matter of 
law because "both public policy and the most reasonable interpretation 
of the statutes [i.e., the Tort Claims Act and the LAD] support the 
conclusion that punitive damages should not be available against a 
public entity under the [LAD]." ACPD's Br. at 20. However, we explicitly 
rejected this argument in Gares v. Willingboro Township, 90 F.3d 720 (3d 
Cir. 1996), and we are unaware of any developments that call this 
decision into question. Second, the ACPD contends that the punitive 
damage award must be vacated because the jury acted inconsistently 
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Because the ACPD did not object to the district court's 
charge on this ground, we will review this claim for plain 
error. 
 
The ACPD asserts that our plain error analysis should be 
guided by the New Jersey Appellate Division's decision in 
Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 695 A.2d 353 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 704 A.2d 19 (N.J. 
1997). In Maiorino, the court observed that"a jury charge 
on punitive damages must include the instruction that 
upper management has to have . . . participated in or 
shown willful indifference to the situation." Id. at 368-69 
(emphasis added) (citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202 
(N.J. 1995)). In fact, the court held that this concept is so 
essential to a fair trial that "the failure to charge the jury 
with the necessity of finding upper management's 
involvement to justify a punitive award is such a 
fundamental flaw that [an appellate court] must recognize 
it as a matter of plain error." Id. at 368 (citation omitted). 
While the Maiorino decision provides persuasive authority 
regarding the substantive correctness of a jury charge in a 
diversity case such as this, it is well established that the 
question of whether error is plain is one of federal law. See 
Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (discussing harmless error); see also Beardshall 
v. Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc., 664 F.2d 23, 27 (3d Cir. 
1981) ("[T]he failure to object to jury instructions and the 
consequences thereof are procedural and are to be 
governed by federal law."). Accordingly, we must look to this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
when it imposed punitive damage liability on the ACPD but not on 
Madamba, the principal upper manager who was involved. This 
argument is also without merit. Punitive damages are awarded to deter 
and punish, and the jury could easily have concluded that the ACPD 
should pay punitive damages because both its potential for harm and its 
responsibility for the widespread harassment were far greater than 
Madamba's alone. Contrary to the ACPD's portrait of the facts, the 
testimony indicated that Madamba was far from a lone bad apple 
poisoning the ACPD. Moreover, the district court properly instructed the 
jury that an award of punitive damages was purely discretionary. We 
need not inquire further about why the jury chose to exercise its 
discretion in this manner. 
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court's plain error jurisprudence when considering the 
ACPD's appeal with respect to the punitive damage award. 
 
We have repeatedly stated that, "[i]n the absence of a 
party's preservation of an assigned error for appeal, we 
review only for plain error, and our power to reverse is 
discretionary." Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 993 (3d Cir.) (quoting 
Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 
F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995)), cert. denied sub nom. 
Jackson v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 
485 (1996). However, we should exercise our discretion 
sparingly so that Rule 51 and the beneficial policy goals it 
serves are not emasculated. See Chemical Leaman, 89 F.3d 
at 993-94; McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 
750, 770 n.31 (3d Cir. 1990). "Thus, we should notice the 
error only if [it] is fundamental and highly prejudicial or if 
the instructions are such that the jury is without adequate 
guidance on a fundamental question and our failure to 
consider the error would result in a miscarriage of justice." 
Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Bereda v. Pickering 
Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1989)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
In the present matter, there can be no doubt that the 
district court's charge was erroneous. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has instructed that two distinct conditions 
must be satisfied before punitive damages may be awarded 
under the LAD. First, "punitive damages can only be 
assessed against an employer if there was `actual 
participation by upper management or willful indifference.' " 
Maiorino, 695 A.2d at 368 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 464); see also Maczik v. Gilford Park 
Yacht Club, 638 A.2d 1322, 1326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). Second, a plaintiff must also set forth "proof that the 
offending conduct [is] `especially egregious.' " Rendine, 661 
A.2d at 1215 (quoting Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., Ltd., 
375 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1977)). Conduct may be sufficiently 
egregious if it is "intentional, malicious, and`evil-minded.' " 
Gares v. Willingboro Twp., 90 F.3d 720, 728 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1215); see also Rendine, 661 
A.2d at 1215 ("Our cases indicate that the requirement [of 
willfulness or wantonness] may be satisfied upon a showing 
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that there has been a deliberate act or omission with 
knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and 
reckless indifference to consequences." (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
By contrast, the district court's punitive damage charge 
clearly failed to instruct the jury on the upper management 
requirement: 
 
        If you find that plaintiff has established that either 
       the Atlantic City Police Department or Henry Madamba 
       is responsible for having engaged in acts of sexual 
       discrimination against the plaintiff, you must consider 
       whether to award punitive damages. You are not to 
       consider the issue of punitive damages against 
       Nicholas Rifice. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        It is not sufficient to award punitive damages solely 
       on the basis that a defendant has engaged in acts of 
       sexual discrimination. 
 
        You may award plaintiff punitive damages solely on 
       the basis that a particular defendant maliciously or 
       wantonly violated plaintiff's rights, and an act is done 
       maliciously if it is prompted by ill will or spite toward 
       the injured person, an evil-minded act. An act is done 
       wantonly if it is done with a reckless, callous or 
       deliberate disregard of the injured person's rights. The 
       plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
       that the defendant acted maliciously or wantonly. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        In making your decision you should consider the 
       purpose of punitive damages. You may consider 
       whether the punitive damages are appropriate in order 
       to punish the defendant adequately, whether punitive 
       damages are necessary to prevent the defendant from 
       committing these acts again, or whether punitive 
       damages are likely to prevent others from committing 
       similar acts. 
 
        If you find the plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
       punitive damages, the court will hold a further 
       proceeding to determine the amount of that award. 
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App. at 5287-89 (emphasis added). 
 
We conclude that the district court committed plain error 
when it failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages 
could only be assessed if there was "actual participation by 
upper management or willful indifference." The court's 
instructions failed to provide proper guidance for the jury 
on a fundamental question. Moreover, our failure to 
consider the error would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
There was also serious disagreement at oral argument and 
in the parties' briefs about whether Madamba was actually 
part of upper management during the relevant times. 24 
Accordingly, we will vacate the punitive damage award 
against the ACPD. 
 
IV. The Individual Defendants 
 
A. Madamba 
 
1. Assorted Challenges 
 
Madamba raises a number of arguments on appeal. First, 
he contends that he was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law because the jury's finding of individual liability under 
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was against the weight of the evidence. 
Implicit in this argument is Madamba's assumption that 
the jury returned a verdict of individual liability under 
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). We do not agree with this assumption. 
The district court's charge in this case clearly stated that 
the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding 
and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. 
 
Hurley argues that supervisors may be individually liable 
as employers under the LAD. The New Jersey courts have 
not specifically addressed the issue. The dissent makes a 
cogent argument for individual liability, and it is clear that 
reasonable people can disagree on this point. But the New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. On remand, the district court must determine whether Madamba 
was part of upper management. The ACPD claims that Madamba was a 
captain, along with numerous others with that rank. Although Madamba 
clearly was a supervisor of the personnel under his command, the ACPD 
contends that he did not establish policy and was not at the top tier of 
the department so as to be part of upper management. If a factual 
dispute should arise, however, the issue would be reserved for the jury. 
 
                                45 
  
Jersey decisions cited by the dissent, see Dissent at 74-77, 
did not rule on individual supervisory liability, and hence 
we do not find them controlling. Nor do we think the 
statutory text offers guidance. While an "employer" may be 
"one or more individuals" under N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(a), that 
does not necessarily mean that supervisors, themselves 
employed by individuals or corporations, are "employers." 
Title VII defines "employer" to include "a person . . . who 
has fifteen or more employees" or "any agent" of such a 
person, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(b), and it could be subjected to 
the same analysis the dissent uses to find individual 
liability possible under LAD. 
 
We also note that imposing direct liability on supervisors, 
who are likely to be substantially judgment-proof, will not 
significantly add to the force of anti-discrimination law, 
which already gives employers incentives to ban 
discrimination and monitor supervisors' activities. We think 
that there is insufficient reason to predict that New Jersey 
would diverge from the federal scheme on this point. See, 
e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996). In sum, while the point is 
close, as well as unclear, we are simply not willing to 
predict that New Jersey would include supervisors in the 
statutory definition of "employer."25 
 
Second, Madamba joins the ACPD's evidentiary 
challenges and its attack on the hostile work environment 
charge, which we have already rejected. Third, he objects 
that the court permitted the jury to find liability against 
Madamba on four separate theories of liability when they 
should have only considered liability for hostile work 
environment sexual harassment. We do not agree, because 
the various theories of liability were properly submitted to 
the jury. There was sufficient evidence on all theories to go 
to the jury, and the instructions clearly indicated that the 
mere presentation of a possible theory to the jury did not 
mean that any defendant was liable on that theory, or on 
any theory. We reiterate that the instructions indicated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Trends may change, however, and a panel looking at this issue a 
year from now might see New Jersey pursuing a different course on 
supervisory liability through section 10:5-5(a). 
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the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding 
and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. 26 
 
Fourth, Madamba argues that the court's compensatory 
damages charge failed to instruct the jury "that it cannot 
award damages for any conduct that plaintiff was not 
subjected to, aware of, or with respect to Madamba, which 
occurred prior to 1990." Madamba Br. at 49-50. But the 
relevant section of the instructions adequately limited 
Madamba's exposure by setting forth the time limits on 
recovery and the purposes for which the jury could use 
evidence of acts not directed at Hurley, even though it did 
not specifically mention Madamba at that point. See supra 
Section II.B. 
 
2. Aiding and Abetting 
 
Finally, Madamba contends that the court's aiding and 
abetting instruction permitted the jury to impose individual 
liability under an erroneous standard. The LAD provides 
that it is unlawful for "any person, whether an employer or 
an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce 
the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to 
attempt to do so." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). In our decision in 
Failla v. City of Passaic, issued after the verdict in this 
case, we held that individual supervisors may be liable for 
aiding and abetting under the LAD. In reaching this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Madamba particularly assails the availability of a quid pro quo 
instruction, which we discuss in greater detail supra Section II.E.2. The 
evidence to support Hurley's quid pro quo theory was a conversation she 
had with Madamba in which she complained about harassment and he 
responded that women in the private sector protect themselves from 
harassment by "sleeping with" their bosses and that women approached 
Madamba for sex "when they're ready." After she made no response to 
these suggestive comments, he allegedly took further discriminatory 
action against her by transferring her to a less desirable position. 
However, as we suggested above, this is less a quid pro quo case than 
a hostile environment case, inter alia because it seems more plausible 
that the transfer, if retaliatory, was based on Hurley's memo alleging 
harassment and not on her rejection of Madamba's putative advances. At 
all events, as discussed below in Section IV.A.2, we conclude that a 
reasonable jury could impose aiding and abetting liability on Madamba 
for his substantial contribution to the hostile work environment; his 
putative advances could be evidence of aiding and abetting. 
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conclusion, we predicted that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
S 876(b) to define aiding and abetting liability under the 
LAD. See Failla, 146 F.3d at 158. That section provides 
"that a person is liable for harm resulting to a third person 
from the conduct of another when he `knows that the 
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives 
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself . . . .' " Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts S 876(b)). We also predicted that, under New Jersey 
law, "inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting 
liability if it rises to the level of providing substantial 
assistance or encouragement." Id. at 158 n.11 (citing Dici v. 
Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
While we have rejected a requirement that an individual 
and an employer share the same discriminatory intent in 
order to find aiding and abetting liability, see Failla, 146 
F.3d at 157, we have not fully elucidated the principles that 
might allow a harassing supervisor to be individually liable 
for aiding and abetting the actionable conduct of his 
employer, when the challenged conduct is failing to stop the 
supervisor's own harassment. Cf. United States v. Sain, 141 
F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that a person can aid 
and abet a corporation that he or she fully owns and 
controls). This is a somewhat awkward theory of liability. 
We believe, however, that it can be explained in this 
manner: A supervisor, under New Jersey law, has a duty to 
act against harassment. See Taylor, 706 A.2d at 691. This 
duty can be violated by deliberate indifference or 
affirmatively harassing acts. When a supervisorflouts this 
duty, he subjects himself and his employer to liability. Cf. 
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761 (N.J. 
1957) (holding that both agent and principal will be liable 
when the agent acts within the scope of his employment 
but for his own purposes). 
 
The ACPD's wrongful conduct in this case was inaction -- 
its tolerance of sexual harassment. The jury had evidence 
before it that Madamba assisted this tolerance by tolerating 
and even encouraging the harassment. As part of the chain 
of command that Hurley was expected to follow, he 
controlled her access to the most effective potential 
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solutions to the harassment. Instead of taking steps to 
assist her, he told her that she should stop complaining or 
it would only get worse; he suggested that sleeping with 
him might protect her; he laughed at the drawings and 
graffiti about her; and he demeaned her as an officer on a 
daily basis. When she finally went over his head and 
requested a transfer because of the harassment, he gave 
his superior a memo accusing her of lying. We are also 
mindful of the moral authority of a police captain over his 
officers. When Madamba laughed at Hurley's discomfort 
and denigrated her, his officers could easily learn the 
lesson that harassing women was part of being an ACPD 
officer. 
 
Madamba arguably failed to stop the harassment because 
he wanted it to continue. But, as Failla held, there is no 
requirement of "shared intent" between the primary 
wrongdoer and the aider and abettor. If Madamba's malice 
substantially assisted the ACPD's inaction, then he is an 
aider and abettor despite any difference in state of mind, 
assuming that the ACPD can be said to have a mental 
state. His liability can be grounded in his failure to stop the 
harassment, which included both active and passive 
components. 
 
Because we conclude that Madamba could be liable for 
aiding and abetting, we must decide whether the jury 
instructions adequately set forth the applicable law. Based 
on Restatement S 876(b), courts have determined that the 
tort of aiding and abetting involves three elements: "(1) the 
party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful 
act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be 
generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or 
tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; 
(3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist 
the principal violation." Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 
477 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also In re Temporomandibular 
Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 
1495 (8th Cir. 1997); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 
(8th Cir. 1985).27 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. To determine whether a defendant provided "substantial assistance," 
the comments to section 876 of the Restatement provide a list of five 
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The district court provided the following charge for aiding 
and abetting: 
 
       [I]ndividual defendants . . . may be held liable only for 
       their individual, affirmative wrongful acts. They may 
       not be held liable for the conduct of others, nor for 
       their inaction or delay in responding to such conduct. 
       An individual defendant may be held liable, however, if 
       he aids, abets, incites, compels or coerces another 
       person's unlawful acts of discrimination. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Aid is defined as meaning to assist, support or 
       supplement the efforts of another. Abet is defined as 
       meaning to encourage, counsel, incite or instigate the 
       commission of unlawful conduct. 
 
        In order the [sic] aid or abet another to commit an 
       unlawful act, it is necessary that the defendant 
       willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way 
       with the unlawful act, and that he willfully and 
       knowingly seek by some act to make the unlawful act 
       succeed. 
 
App. at 5284, 5314. 
 
Although the district court's charge is compatible in some 
respects with the substance of section 876(b), the court 
misstates the law in two crucial respects: First, the charge 
does not allow for liability based on inaction. To be sure, 
Madamba can hardly claim he was prejudiced by this 
particular omission, because the jury concluded that he 
committed affirmative, harassing conduct. But the 
instructions also allowed the jury to impose liability for 
mere assistance, rather than substantial assistance. This 
was incorrect. Moreover, we cannot conclude that it is 
highly probable that the absence of a substantial assistance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
factors: "the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance 
given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, 
his relation to the other and his state of mind." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts S 876(b) cmt. d. (1979). Additionally, the court in Halberstam 
provided a sixth factor, the duration of the assistance provided. See 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. 
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requirement did not affect the jury's verdict. See 
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 924. Accordingly, we must vacate 
the judgment against Madamba and order a new trial. 28 
 
B. Rifice 
 
Hurley argues in her cross-appeal that the district court's 
aiding and abetting charge misstated the law under the 
LAD by requiring a finding of affirmative sexual harassment 
before Rifice could be found individually liable. She also 
argues that the district court erred by striking her punitive 
damage claim against Rifice. We agree. 
 
As noted above, the district court's aiding and abetting 
charge provided that the "individual defendants such as 
Nicholas Rifice and Henry Madamba . . . may only be held 
liable for their individual, affirmative wrongful acts." XXII 
App. at 5284. However, in Failla, we expressly rejected this 
view and concluded that "inaction can form the basis of 
aiding and abetting liability if it rises to the level of 
providing substantial assistance or encouragement." Failla, 
146 F.3d at 158 n.11. Accordingly, the district court's 
charge misstated the law under the LAD. The district court 
noted that the charge might well have determined the jury's 
verdict. See Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 417-18. 
 
The evidence against Rifice mainly concerned his 
awareness of and apparent indifference to the harassment. 
Rifice testified that he did nothing to stop the harassment 
because the harassers should already have known better 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Madamba additionally argues that the jury instructions were flawed 
because they covered aiding and abetting "another person's unlawful 
acts" and then, when the jury inquired further, the court stated that the 
defendant had to "willfully and knowingly associate himself with the 
unlawful act." Madamba Letter at 8. He argues that this is erroneous 
because the instruction should have required association with the 
employer and not the act. This is a misreading of Failla, which rejected 
a shared intent requirement. Moreover, Madamba was associated with 
his employer as a matter of course. Finally, the New Jersey Appellate 
Division case of Baliko v. Stecker, 645 A.2d 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994), undermines Madamba's position. Baliko held that aiding and 
abetting liability could exist when one union member aided other union 
members and the sum total of acts was sufficient to cause the union to 
be liable. 
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and he did not believe that he could do anything about it. 
This kind of knowing inaction by a high-level employee with 
responsibility over Hurley and her harassers could, we 
think, rise to the level of substantial assistance. We will 
therefore vacate the judgment in favor of Rifice and the 
district court's order striking plaintiff's punitive damage 
claim against Rifice. 
 
C. Mooney 
 
Hurley next argues that the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Mooney.29 
Mooney argued, and the district court agreed, that he was 
entitled to summary judgment on Hurley's LAD claim 
because, as a non-supervisory co-employee, he was not an 
"employer" for purposes of N.J. Stat. Ann.S 10:5-5(e).30 See 
Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 1995 WL 854478, at *10 
(D.N.J. Aug. 4, 1995). The court reached this conclusion, in 
part, because "non-supervisory co-employees cannot be 
held liable under Title VII, and New Jersey courts have 
often looked to that statute to resolve questions under the 
NJLAD." Id. (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 452). Although 
Mooney may have had considerable unofficial power 
because of his well-known promotion prospects and high- 
ranking relatives, he was not an "employer." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. We review the district court's decision granting summary judgment 
de novo, and we apply the same test the district court should have 
applied in the first instance. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 
F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d 
Cir. 1995). We must determine, therefore, whether the record, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to Hurley, shows that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that Mooney was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249- 
50 (1986). 
 
30. The Act provides that an employer "includes all persons as defined in 
subsection a. of this section unless otherwise specifically exempt under 
another section of this act, and includes the State, any political or 
civil 
subdivision thereof, and all public officers, agencies, boards or bodies." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-5(e). Subsection (a) provides that the term 
"[p]erson includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, 
organizations, labor organizations, corporations, legal representatives, 
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries." N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 10:5-5(a). 
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Hurley argues that S 10:5-5(e) is not relevant because 
Mooney was individually liable under the LAD as an aider 
and abettor. We predict that, under New Jersey law, a 
nonsupervisory employee cannot be held liable as an aider 
and abettor for his own affirmative acts of harassment, 
because such affirmative acts do not substantially assist 
the employer in its wrong, which is its failure to prevent 
and redress harassment by individual employees. 31 Rather, 
a nonsupervisory employee's harassment takes advantage 
of the employer's wrongful conduct; it is the employee who 
seems to be "aided and abetted" by the employer.32 A 
supervisor, by contrast, may be liable as an aider and 
abettor for active harassment or knowing and willful 
inaction, because in either case the supervisor violates his 
or her duty as a supervisor to prevent and halt harassment.33 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. The dissent argues that the employer's wrong can also consist of the 
wrongs of its supervisors who commit willful harassment. This is a 
thorny question of agency law; usually, the employer is said to be 
vicariously liable for certain acts of its agents, as in Ellerth and 
Faragher, 
and directly liable for its own negligence, if any, in allowing its agents 
to 
behave badly. Query whether vicarious liability means that a person who 
aids and abets an agent also aids and abets the principal? We need not 
resolve this nice question, however, because the dissent's argument 
presupposes that Madamba can be held individually liable as a harasser 
under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-5(a), a proposition we have already predicted that 
New Jersey courts would reject. Moreover, if the claim were that Mooney 
substantially assisted Madamba's harassment, no reasonable jury could 
find that Mooney's conduct rose to the level of substantial assistance 
based only on the two incidents recited by the dissent. 
 
32. Mooney claims that a nonsupervisor cannot aid and abet because 
only supervisors can create liability for an employer. As cases imposing 
liability for coworker harassment demonstrate, that statement of the law 
is erroneous. We also note that, under the LAD, "any person" may aid 
and abet; no ability to bind the employer is necessary. New Jersey may 
ultimately decide, contrary to our prediction, that harassment by a 
nonsupervisory employee can constitute aiding and abetting, in which 
case we would of course follow its interpretation of state law. 
 
33. We note that the claims against the individual defendants are largely 
symbolic. Hurley's monetary recovery will come from the ACPD, and in 
practical terms the liability of the individual defendants is not that 
significant. 
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